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Recent cases of censorship and self-censorship conducted both by institutions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and private actors have made international headlines. Surprisingly, it took a 
backlash at the NBA over a tweet supporting the Hong Kong 2019 anti-
extradition law protests,1 the ban of a Hong Kong Hearthstone gamer by 
Blizzard,2 and an episode of “South Park”3 to shed a light on the extent of 
censorship in the PRC and its impact abroad. Among all these controversies, 
which mostly concerned foreign companies sometimes getting ahead of 
the Chinese authorities’ desires, music has been an important part of the 
recent crackdown. Songs related to the Hong Kong protests, such as “Do 
you hear the people sing?”,4 or to the democratic movement of 1989, have 
disappeared from the Chinese Internet. In contrast, music has also been used 
as a tool to resist PRC censorship in the Sinophone world, be it in Hong Kong 
during the protests, or in Taiwan with for instance the song “Tryna Bully” 
by the rapper Dwagie 大支.5 Musical censorship can take different shapes, 
from the online disappearance of songs and lyrics to visa bans and concert 
cancellations, but also self-censorship by private companies or individuals, in 
order to protect themselves or gain a bigger market share. 
Most of the studies dealing with censorship in China are focused on the 
highly debated online censorship, with its armies of Internet users publishing 
nationalistic content nicknamed “fifty cents” (wumao 五毛, in reference 
to the salary the government is believed to grant them for each posted 
message, see Han 2015), its banned keywords (Ng 2013), the use of the 
meme – the replication of a cultural element shared on the Internet – as 
a challenge to censorship (Tang and Yang 2011), or the censorship system 
regarding literature and cinema (Veg 2007; Pernin 2015). Analyses of the 
institutional mechanisms presiding over the effective censorship of cultural 
works are, however, often absent – particularly in the case of music, with the 
exception of research conducted by Sabine Trebinjac (2000) on the “Regional 
administrative service of popular songs’ compilations” (Diqu minjian yinyue 
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jicheng bangongshi 地區民間音樂集成辦公室), which is tasked with the 
collection and categorisation of folk music, and Jeroen de Kloet’s work on 
Chinese musical communities, and more precisely on “linguistic camouflage,” 
when Chinese musicians have to falsify provocative lyrics (2010: 180-90). 
Following in the footsteps of this research, this article aims at identifying the 
official institutions responsible for musical censorship and how the Chinese 
musical world navigates these obstacles in order to produce and circulate 
music. What are the institutions involved in the censorship process? How 
can one negotiate with the authorities? Is there room for circumventing 
these written or unwritten rules? Drawing on observations and interviews 
conducted from 2011 onward in Beijing, Wuhan, Shenzhen, Changsha, 
and Tianjin within the Chinese punk rock music scene, which is regularly 
confronted with issues of censorship, this paper seeks to outline how musical 
censorship is practically implemented, as well as its most recent evolutions. 
These observations allow us to better understand how censorship and self-
censorship work today, and broaden the scope of past studies on rock (Jones 
1992; Campbell 2011), underground music of the 1990s (Groenewegen 
2011), and other genres not limited to the Chinese capital (Grillot 2001). 
Apart from the official institutions that artists have to contend with in order 
1. Tripti Lahiri, “The backlash over China’s NBA bullying is only going to get worse,” Quartz, 18 
October 2019, https://qz.com/1730643/china-asked-nba-to-fire-daryl-morey-for-hong-kong-
tweet/ (accessed on 2 November 2019).
2. Peter Allen Clark, “What to Know About Blizzard, Hong Kong and the Controversy Over Politics in 
Esports,” Time, 21 October 2019, https://time.com/5702971/blizzard-esports-hearthstone-hong-
kong-protests-backlash-blitzchung/ (accessed on 2 November 2019).
3. Daniel Victor, “South Park Creators Offer Fake Apology After Show Is Erased in China,” The New 
York Times, 8 October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/arts/television/south-park-
china.html (accessed on 2 November 2019). 
4. “Do you hear the people sing? Not in China,” The Economist, 14 June 2019, https://www.
economist.com/prospero/2019/06/14/do-you-hear-the-people-sing-not-in-china (accessed on 2 
November 2019).
5. See the videoclip of the song: https://youtu.be/zAfiZ73FIsU (accessed on 2 November 2019).
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to release a record, they also have to deal with a range of actors – police 
officers, municipal agents from the Bureau of Culture, the cultural police, and 
municipal law enforcement officers – when they perform in public. First, I 
will outline how censorship of musical works has been organised since 1949, 
before delineating the mechanisms to which artists must conform when they 
release a record or organise a concert. Finally, I will show how recent cases 
reveal more discretionary practices of censorship, and raise concerns about 
the export of Chinese censorship to other regions of the Sinophone world. 
Institutions of cultural censorship 
The control of Chinese cultural expression was theorised very early by 
Communist Party leaders, most notably by Mao Zedong 毛澤東 in his 1942 
“Talks at the Yan’an Forum on Literature and Art” (Mao 1942) – a theme 
already discussed at the Gutian 古田 conference in 1929 (Trebinjac 2000: 
37). This cultural policy led to the promotion of artistic forms combining 
elements from popular Chinese culture with features from communist 
propaganda, such as the yangge 秧歌 dance, “a collective traditional dance, 
tied to the annual cycle of agricultural work, accompanied by songs and 
various musical instruments” (Graezer 1999: 31), used for propaganda 
purposes by the cultural cadres of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
and appropriated during the Cold War by Sinophone leftist communities 
(Wilcox 2020). As of 1949, cultural production with regards to cinema, radio, 
and television was nationalised (Berry 2004). The Chinese Association of 
Musicians (Zhongguo yinyuejia xiehui 中國音樂家協會) was created in July 
1949 to propagate music that conforms to Party requirements and to train 
a new generation of socialist musicians (Ju 2002), following on from the 
Association of Leftist Musicians (Zuoyi yinyue zuzhi 左翼音樂組織), created 
in 1932 and dissolved in 1936 (Trebinjac 2000: 24). Musical production 
was strictly controlled, as evidenced by the creation of the China Record 
Corporation (Zhongguo changpian jituan youxian gongsi 中國唱片集團有
限公司) in May 1949, which then held the monopoly of music distribution 
in the PRC.6 Chinese folk songs – including those by national minorities 
and from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan – were collected and compiled 
by the “Administrative Service of Compilations,” under the responsibility of 
the State Council and “comprised of at least ten thousand officials tasked 
with the collection of national music and, following censorship and self-
censorship, with the elaboration of a compilation” (ibid.: 129) in line with 
socialist values. The so-called “pornographic” songs (huangse yinyue 黃色
音樂, literally “yellow music”), in reality popular romantic songs produced 
in Shanghai in the 1930s, were banned, prompting Andrew F. Jones to argue 
that “Chinese music was shamelessly charged with the spreading of Maoist 
ideals of class struggle, revolutionary fervour and self-denial” (Jones 1992: 
11-2).
Mao’s death in 1976 and the launch of economic reforms by Deng 
Xiaoping 鄧小平 resulted in a relative relaxation of censorship regarding 
popular culture and an effervescence of the musical field. In spite of the 
sultry nature of her love songs, Taiwanese singer Teresa Teng (Deng Lijun 鄧
麗君) became extremely popular in the PRC with the emergence of pirated 
cassettes, to the point that a famous saying in the 1970s said that “old Deng 
[Xiaoping] rules by day, little Teng [Lijun] rules by night” (Gold 1993: 909). 
Artists who were independent from state-sponsored institutions began to 
organise, and new musical styles emerged, such as “prison songs” (qiuge 囚
歌),7 then Rock ‘and’ Roll (yaogun 搖滾) in the 1980s (Jones 1992). After a 
first wave of popularisation in the late 1980s, rock and roll and other cultural 
productions became firmly controlled after the Tiananmen crackdown, as 
major rock singers including Cui Jian 崔健 and He Yong 何勇 took position for 
the students in 1989, resulting in a “massive nationwide enforcement to sao 
huang 掃黃 (sweep the Yellow publications) annually since 1989” (Gao 2014: 
129). In the mid-1990s, a new independent music scene emerged outside the 
official circuit, favoured by the appearance of pirated cassettes (daoban 盜版) 
by Taiwanese and Hong Kong artists such as Beyond, then of dakou tapes and 
CDs (打口, literally “broken”) available on the black market in many Chinese 
cities. These CDs and cassette tapes, an embarrassing surplus of the Western 
music industry, were sent to China for recycling, but ended up being sold 
illegally at low prices in the streets of major Chinese cities from 1993 onwards 
(De Kloet 2005). Chinese youngsters, unable at the time to legally obtain 
Western music albums, mostly banned or sold at prohibitive prices, largely 
turned towards these trafficked products. New musical genres then appeared 
in major Chinese cities in the mid-1990s, ranging from alternative rock, punk, 
and hip-hop to metal. In that way, they bypassed official censorship as well as 
the music industry unable to satisfy them: 
The rights to publish and reproduce print publications (yinshua 
chubanwu (印刷出版物) – tapes, videocassettes and optical discs) 
were exclusively entitled to a small number of state-owned presses, 
whose production capacities (in terms of both the variety of titles and 
the quality of the output) were quite incompatible with the citizens’ 
enormous appetite for cultural products (…). (Gao 2014: 127)
The opening-up of the 1990s, and the blooming of new musical styles 
not approved by the authorities, did not significantly alter the censorship 
policies regarding musical content. The history of various administrative 
control bodies of cultural products also intersects with internal quarrels over 
the prerogatives granted to each administration. Music itself is governed 
by different institutions according to the way it is broadcasted. Censorship 
procedures and propaganda supervision were initially allocated to the 
Ministry of Radio, Film and Television (Guangbo dianying dianshi bu 廣播
電影電視部) until 1986, when it was replaced by the Film and Television 
Bureau, which in 1998 became the State Administration of Radio, Film and 
Television (SARFT, Guojia guangbo dianying dianshi zongju 國家廣播電影
電視總局), placed under direct supervision of the State Council (Latham 
2005: 779) with “branch offices at all levels of government down to the 
township level” (ibid.: 778). Another body, the State Press and Publication 
Administration, established in 1954 and also monitored by the State Council, 
in charge of publications and copyrights, previously competed with the 
SARFT before being integrated into its fold in 1998 (Hu 2005: 781). In 2013, 
the SARFT became the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television (SAPPRFT, Guojia xinwen chuban guang dian zongju 國
家新聞出版廣電總局), and was dissolved in March 2018 within the new 
National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA, Guojia guangbo dianshi 
zongju 國家廣播電視總局), under the direct supervision of the Propaganda 
Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
(Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu 中共中央宣傳部), founded in 1924, 
6. Since 2003, the China Record Corporation (CRC) has been controlled by the State Council 
(Guowuyuan 國務院), itself chaired by the Prime Minister. See the CRC website: http://www.
china-crc.com.cn/View/2543.html (accessed on 30 June 2019).
7. A music fad associated with the “Northwest Wind” (Xibeifeng 西北風) musical genre, performed 
by ex-convicts or sent-down youth (zhiqing 知情) of the Cultural Revolution (see Baranovitch 
2003: 26).
8. Pang-Chie Ho, “Goodbye, SAPPRFT (But not Chinese censorship),” SupChina, 21 March 2018, 
https://supchina.com/2018/03/21/goodbye-sapprft-but-not-chinese-censorship/ (accessed on 30 
June 2019). 
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and mainly in charge of information control.8 This recent decision, after 
years of centralisation, confirms the Party’s drive to directly steer censorship 
bodies on behalf of the state and to directly take over the propaganda tools. 
Its main purpose is to regulate the media, issue publication authorisations, 
and supervise the distribution of cultural works. Henceforth also in charge 
of censorship on the Internet, it directly manages the main Chinese media 
groups, namely China Central Television (CCTV), China Radio International 
(CRI), and China National Radio (CNR). Since Xi Jinping’s 習近平 presidency, 
the NRTA must also promote the “hegemonic discourse” carried out by the 
Party through officially broadcasted cultural works, by fostering “positive 
energy” (zhengnengliang 正能量) in culture and the media, as defined by Xi 
in 2013. This “positive energy” symbolises the “attitudes or emotions that 
are aligned with the ideological or value systems of the Party-state, or any 
discourses that promote such an alignment” (Yang and Tang 2018: 2). In a 
speech given in 2017, Xi Jinping insisted that “artists focus on the people 
during their cultural creation work, thereby providing strong spiritual power 
for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (…) artists should work for 
the people and socialism.”9 On the other hand, the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism (Wenhua he lüyou bu 文化和旅遊部) and the various local cultural 
bureaus are responsible for overseeing live music and live venues.10 Artists 
and managers therefore have to deal with different authorities when they 
release an album or a videoclip, or when they organise a concert.
Negotiating with the authorities: Releasing an 
album, organising a concert
Although the authorities in charge of regulating the cultural field are 
present at all administrative levels, many labels, media outlets, or producers 
of cultural content are not directly controlled by the state. State-owned 
enterprises and agencies delegate the task of publishing works that are 
adapted to the market to specific private companies through the attribution 
of official authorisations to publish (chubanwu 出版物, which include 
newspapers, books, audiovisual productions, and electronic publications) 
granted by the State Council, while being vigilant about the ideological 
content of these works, since publications should “promote the construction 
of the socialist spiritual civilization.”11 In the 1980s and until the mid-
1990s, the first Chinese rockers Cui Jian, He Yong, Dou Wei 竇唯, and the 
heavy metal band Tang Dynasty (Tang chao 唐朝), bypassed the chubanwu 
by issuing a large portion of their cassettes through companies located in 
Taiwan or in Hong Kong, such as Rock Records (Yaoshi 搖石) or Magic Stone 
(Moyan changpian 魔岩唱片). But from the late 1990s onwards, the first 
independent labels were established, initially to circulate the works of the 
emerging rock scene. These labels were independent (duli  獨立), in the sense 
that they did not belong to state-controlled companies or to large record 
companies, but they nonetheless had to negotiate with state-owned music 
institutions in order to get these chubanwu. Shen Lihui 沈黎暉, the singer of 
the Brit-Pop group Sober (Qingxing 清醒), embodies a central figure in this 
new musical entrepreneurship. Previously a graphic designer for the China 
Record Corporation, Shen Lihui decided to self-produce rock albums, and 
in 1997 he founded the label Modern Sky (Modeng tiankong 摩登天空), 
allowing him to release that same year his band’s first album, which sold at 
150,000 official and 300,000 illegal copies (Steen 2000: 7). Modern Sky also 
set up a label devoted to alternative music, Badhead Records, and produced 
most of the records by groups in the “New Beijing sound” movement (Beijing 
xinsheng 北京新聲; see Ou, Yan, and Nie 1999). Some have accused Modern 
Sky of commercialising, and thus over-formatting Chinese rock music, while 
others have pointed to the “typical post-modern PRC paradox” (Steen 
2000: 9) that Modern Sky would represent for the Chinese music industry, 
always overly cautious when it comes to releasing rock albums. In 1999, 
Scream Records (Haojiao changpian 嚎叫唱片) was created out of the ashes 
of the punk bar Scream Club (Haojiao julebu 嚎叫俱樂部), and produced 
the first albums of the capital’s punk, metal and hip-hop communities. Artist 
Lü Bo 呂波 and rocker Wang Di 王迪 produced the first album of Wuliao 
Jundui (無聊軍隊, literally “the Boredom Contingent”), the first Beijing punk 
collective, in collaboration with Jing Wen Records (京文), a label specialising 
in the import of foreign albums. Other labels were put in place throughout 
the 2000s, including Maybe Mars (Bingmasi 兵馬司), created in 2007 by the 
American Michael Pettis, which produced a number of independent bands 
that emerged in the mid-2000s thanks to the D-22 bar in Beijing, also owned 
by Pettis. The D-22 closed its door in 2012, and its successor, the XP, was 
forced to do the same in July 2015, after inviting the Japanese artist Makoto 
Kawabata, who was blacklisted by the Beijing municipal government.12 As for 
Maybe Mars, it was sold in 2018 to the large company Taihe 太合, now taking 
advantage of this to commercialise its catalogue by making its rock artists 
participate in TV talent shows,13 which require bands to change their lyrics.14
Although these labels are not directly controlled by the state, they still 
need support from official labels to legally publish music content. A common 
practice consists of purchasing ISRC (International Standard Recording Code) 
numbers, as a Maybe Mars employee recalls: 
We cannot release our own albums ourselves. We need to buy ISRC 
numbers from official labels. Since they have too many of them and 
need the money, they can sell some of them to independent labels, 
and, as a result, do not lose their quota of ISRC numbers granted by 
the government. Before being able to release an album, we must 
submit the lyrics of the songs, so that they validate them. That is why 
sometimes we have to change the lyrics ourselves before submitting 
them. If we release a CD that does not appeal to the government, 
the administration will turn against the label that sold us the ISRC 
numbers; they will receive fewer numbers, and will stop selling to us.15
The same process is also at work when it comes to books; as Sebastian 
Veg points out, “Books must similarly obtain an ISBN number, which certain 
state publishers sell to smaller and more independent publishers willing to 
take the risk of a subsequent ban after publication” (2007: 66-7). In other 
9. An Baijie, “Xi urges artists to focus on the people,” China Daily, 28 September 2017, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-09/28/content_32580095.htm (accessed on 20 June 2019). 
10. Jiayun Feng, “Inside China’s ever-evolving censorship apparatus,” SupChina, 23 August 2019, 
https://signal.supchina.com/inside-chinas-ever-evolving-censorship-apparatus/ (accessed on 2 
November 2019). 
11. Article 1 of the “Regulations on publishing management” (Chuban guanli tiaoli  出版管理條例) 
of the State Council: http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25110.htm (accessed on 
30 June 2019).
12. See Yan Jun, “Drugs, Violence, Porno, Mafia, Anti-government, Anti-religion and Acid Mothers 
Temple,” Wire, May 2015, https://www.thewire.co.uk/in-writing/columns/yan-jun_drugs_
violence_porno_mafia_anti-government_anti-religion-and-acid-mothers-temple (accessed on 30 
June 2019).
13. See Fan Shuhong, “Is ‘The Big Bang’ About To Do for Rock Music What ‘Rap of China’ Did for 
Hip Hop?,” RadiiChina, 19 May 2019, https://radiichina.com/the-big-band-iqiyi-rock-reality-tv/ 
(accessed on 30 June 2019). 
14. For instance, the band Hedgehog (Ciwei 刺猬) had to change the lyrics “Society is a pain 
competition” (shehui shi shanghai de bisai  社會是傷害的比賽) into “Time is a pain 
competition” (shijian shi shanghai de bisai 世間是傷害的比賽) during The Big Band TV 
show. See 樂隊的夏天歌詞刪改匯總 (Yuedui de xiatian geci shangai huizong, A summary 
of lyrics deletion in The Big Band), Yousuodu, 4 August 2019, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/
K1tj6ynlx9QWDTu2mwKd2A (accessed on 14 September 2019).
15. Interview, Beijing, 14 December 2014.
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words, in the case of music albums and books, state publishers outsource 
the risk of censorship to independent companies. In this case, censorship 
plays out at different levels. If a band wants to officially release an album 
– that is to say, sell it via the authorised commercial circuits or on the 
Internet – it must submit its songs to the label’s administration, where a 
first selection takes place. Bands and labels very often modify the lyrics 
of the songs in order to adapt to the norms defined by the SAPPRFT, and 
most often anticipate the decisions of the Censorship Bureau. As Jeroen de 
Kloet points out, “besides establishing and maintaining good relations with 
the authorities, a good publisher knows the right tactics to employ when 
negotiating the rules” (2010: 183). Thus, to avoid being accused of promoting 
pornography, bands and publishers change offending terms, even in English, 
for instance changing “fuck” to “funk” in the case of the Wuliao Jundui, or 
turning “sex” (xing 性) into “heart” (xin 心) for The Fly (Cangying 蒼蠅) (De 
Kloet 2010: 185). Similar practices of self-censorship occur in other contexts, 
namely religious ones, when it comes to compiling Uyghur folk songs, as 
noted by Sabine Trebinjac: “Lyrics are changed in order to make too religious 
or amorous references more discreet” (2000: 363).
It is not only the lyrics, but also the sounds that must fit the requirements 
of the state institutions. But sound can also be used to hide problematic 
words. In the music video of the song “Awakening” (Juexing 覺醒), by one 
of the first Beijing punk bands UnderBaby (Dixia ying’er 地下嬰兒), the lyric 
“I want to take my blood and shit, and throw it onto the flag”16 posed a 
particular challenge for the label. The producers of the clip therefore decided 
to add the diegetic sound of a truck in order to skilfully cover the subversive 
sentence.
Selling albums the official way implies a negotiation with the authorities, 
and some bands navigate between official and underground publications 
depending on the political content of their albums. For instance the Wuhan 
punk band SMZB (Shengming zhi bing 生命之餅) published an album with 
the label Scream Records and distributed by the China Records Corporation 
in 2001, but their label decided not to even apply for an ISRC number in 
2014 for the album A Letter From China (Zhongguo laixin 中國來信), which 
featured pictures of the Tiananmen protests. 
The mere act of setting up a live performance requires the agreement of 
local bureaus of the Ministry of Culture, delivered through administrative 
procedures that few live venues can afford to apply for. Already in the 1980s, 
the nascent Chinese rock community had to find alternative spaces to 
perform. Although they started playing in several universities in the capital, 
it was in international hotels and restaurants, less subject to control by the 
authorities, that the Beijing “rock circle” (yaogun quan 搖滾圈) really thrived 
(Capdeville-Zeng 2002). From the late 1980s onwards, under the impulse of 
Li Ji 李季 of the band Bu Dao Weng 不倒翁, rock live performances took the 
form of a “party” (the term used in rock circles), improvised performances 
in bars of the capital, without any authorisation from the municipality. In 
1992, Li Ji opened up a space devoted to these “parties,” the Happy Club 
(Xinfu julebu 幸福俱樂部); it closed down quickly after facing pressure 
from the Beijing municipal authorities (Xue 1993: 282). In 1995, Liu Yuan 
劉元, Cui Jian’s trumpet player, opened the CD Café, which hosted the 
capital’s rock and underground scene, and allowed Cui Jian to perform in 
public, although he was officially banned from performing in Beijing from 
1989 to 2007.17 In Cui Jian’s case, censorship paradoxes are amplified. He 
was allowed to organise a (shortened) tour in 1990 to promote the Asian 
Games, a few months after the 1989 repression (Campbell 2011: 85), but 
he also had to confront provincial administrations – for instance, in 1995 
an authorised performance in Taiyuan 太原 was abruptly cancelled by the 
provincial government without explanation.18 These are problems that other 
music communities also dealt with in the mid-1990s: without the necessary 
authorisations – the licence to perform in public (yanchuzheng 演出證) 
is issued by the central government – concerts can be interrupted by the 
police, as the American David O’Dell writes in his memoirs (2011: 29).
Since this permit is difficult to obtain, most live venues do without it. A 
concert organiser in Beijing describes how best to avoid interference by the 
authorities: 
You have an official, semi-official, and underground way to organise 
concerts. [F]or an official concert (…), there are some state-owned 
companies or national stages that have the licences and authorisation 
to submit the application, by presenting the artist’s lyrics, which 
requires lots of time and money. Generally, we mainly opt for the 
second way; we go through something semi-official; we would 
introduce the artist to the Bureau of Culture, inform the police of 
the artist’s arrival and we can sell tickets although not in the official 
network. The third option is to hold concerts in prohibited places, like 
parties, or in cellars; and there you can end up having real problems.19
Censorship and self-censorship are not only administrative; they are often 
embodied by the figure of the police officer, seen as a last resort to prevent 
concerts from happening. 
“They switched off the sound…”: Confrontations 
with the police
On 9 August 2014, a scene familiar to the Chinese underground music 
scene took place in Beijing’s Chaoyang district. Ten police officers arrived at 
2 Kolegas (Liangge haopengyou 兩個好朋友), a bar that hosted not only a 
yearly punk festival, but also various other musical genres, including techno 
music. After a compulsory urine test for all the audience, nine individuals were 
arrested on drug-use charges, including five foreigners who were immediately 
escorted back to the border. The bar was forced to close.20 Police interventions 
vary according to various political meetings and governmental campaigns 
against pornography, foreign influence, or drug consumption. 
Police raids are most often a source of conflict and financial problems for 
live venues, but also provide opportunities to negotiate with the police on 
a case-by-case basis, through bribes and persuasion. In Wuhan, in 2011, the 
police tried to cancel a SMZB concert: 
We were booked to perform at the VOX Livehouse; 700 people 
had bought their tickets in advance. People started lining up in the 
afternoon; at 5 pm the cops arrived. They said that there were too 
many people, and that the concert needed to be cancelled. I arrived 
and talked to them. I told them that people had already bought their 
16. “我要把我的熱血和大便都通通拋在這旗幟上面” (Wo yao ba wo de rexue he dabian dou 
tongtong pao zai zhe qizhi shangmian).
17. Cui Jian was not allowed to perform officially in Beijing until 2007, even if this ban was not 
strictly enforced. For instance, this is a video of a concert organised by the French Embassy in 
1997: https://youtu.be/r8Rs1NUaUNg (accessed on 30 June 2019).
18. See the interview of Cui Jian by BBC World in 1995: https://youtu.be/53E2Ij9uvP0?t=211 
(accessed on 30 June 2019).
19. Interview, Beijing, 26 May 2012. 
20. Jared Cline, “2 Kolegas random drug test sees nine arrested,” TimeOut Beijing, 11 August 2014, 
http://www.timeoutbeijing.com/features/Blogs-Nightlife_Blogs/31906/2-Kolegas-random-drug-
test-sees-nine-arrested.html (accessed on 30 June 2019).
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tickets, and that they could not do this. After talking for half an hour, 
they agreed to only let in 200 people. Then, throughout the entire 
concert, there were cops standing inside and outside the venue…21
In general, police intervention during a concert is due to the size of the 
audience. This especially affects major rock festivals and pop concerts that 
can host tens of thousands of spectators. The use of physical violence by 
police during concerts sporadically sparks indignation online. In 2018, a video 
shot during a concert by the English pop singer Dua Lipa in Shanghai, showing 
security agents hitting spectators who were waving a LGBT flag, or who had 
stood up from their seats to dance, caused a scandal both abroad and in 
China.22 This is in fact typical of crowd control during concerts: in 1986, during 
a Shanghai performance of the American surf-rock band Jan and Dean, police 
officers “completely foreign to this kind of behaviour” hit spectators who had 
risen to dance, triggering a student demonstration in Shanghai (Baranovitch 
2003: 35). Large music festivals are also the stage for new forms of security 
experiments, as with the Midi Music Festival (Midi yinyuejie 迷笛音樂
節) in Shenzhen, held on 30-31 December 2017, with X-ray security gates, 
identity card scans, and facial recognition, supervised by policemen (jingcha 
警察), special security guards (tebao 特保) from the Longgang 龍崗 district, 
and private security guards (bao’an 保安). The Shenzhen police intended to 
criminalise all expressions of joy usually associated with rock concerts, such as 
pogos and stage-diving, where a spectator jumps into the crowd and is carried 
at arm’s length. At each attempt of stage-diving, three police officers forced 
their way through the crowd to brutally pull the transgressor to the ground, 
before arresting and escorting the latter out of the festival. These stage-dives 
also provided an opportunity for festival-goers to showcase a great deal of 
solidarity. Pretexting a stampede, the audience physically placed themselves 
between the police and the stage-diver, thus giving him or her time to 
escape. Police interventions culminated during the last performance of the 
festival; while SMZB played on the main stage, policemen arrested countless 
stage-divers. Despite submitting their song list in advance for approval by 
local authorities, SMZB members decided to perform an unapproved song, 
“Smash His Statue” – a reference to Mao’s statues – while screening a video 
of Tiananmen Square behind them. After a few seconds, the projector was 
switched off along with the singer’s microphone, while the tens of thousands 
of spectators resumed the rest of the song in chorus. This performance earned 
the band several hours at the police station before they were released with a 
simple slap on the wrist.
The practice of denouncing has also grown in popularity in recent 
years with the possibility of filing complaints on the websites of various 
administrations.23 In December 2017, a certain Liu Haizhu 劉海柱 filed 
a complaint on the website of the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Culture 
(Beijing shi wenhuaju 北京市文化局), demanding the ban of SMZB’s live 
performance at the new MAO Livehouse in Beijing, and accusing the band 
of “discrediting the Communist Party, of diminishing the prestige of social 
stability and nation-building,” by quoting the lyrics of one song praising 
the guitarist’s grandfather, a nationalist soldier killed during the War of 
Resistance against Japan24 (Figure 2). According to band members, the 
complaint was most likely related to a grim story of enmity with the owners 
of this new live venue located in Beijing’s Wukesong district. The concert 
was not cancelled, but a diffuse tension was palpable throughout the 
performance: the manager of the venue got on stage several times to ask the 
singer to stop talking directly to the audience, and agents of the Municipal 
Bureau of Culture were present at the venue. A similar complaint was filed 
on the same website, this time against the metal band Voodoo Kongfu (Lingyi 
零壹) at one of the band’s concerts at Yugong Yishan 愚公移山 in Beijing. 
The band was accused of “drinking blood on stage, using violence and 
pornography, and singing vulgar and reactionary songs.”
21. Interview, Wuhan, 18 December 2012.
22. Laura Snapes, “Dua Lipa ‘proud’ of fans ejected from concert for waving LGBT flags,” The 
Guardian, 13 September 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/music/2018/sep/13/fans-
removed-dua-lipa-shanghai-concert-china (accessed on 30 June 2019).
23. For a more comprehensive history of the complaints addressed to the Chinese administration, 
see Thireau and Hua (2010).
24. See the music video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJ3WZi_gwwM (accessed on 30 June 
2019). 
Figure 1. Police presence during concerts, Shenzhen Midi Music Festival, 31 December 2017. 
Photo credit: author.
Figure 2. Screenshot of the complaint submitted to the website of the Beijing Municipal Bureau of 
Culture, 5 December 2017. Image provided by the author. 
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While these complaints did not result in cancelling the concerts, others 
succeeded in provoking cancellations and the closing down of venues. For 
instance, a live venue in Wuhan had to cancel a performance after a police 
raid: “Apparently, someone denounced us, saying that we didn’t have the 
authorisation for hosting a foreign band. The police imposed a 20,000 yuan 
fine on the bar.”25 More recently, the control of foreign artists has taken the 
form of economic pressure, especially since February 2019, when the National 
Tax Administration (Guojia shuiwu zongju 國家稅務總局) announced that all 
concerts by foreign bands (including artists coming from Hong Kong, Macao, 
and Taiwan) would be taxed at 20% of all generated revenue. Some, like the 
journalist Wu Ying 武攖 in an article for the magazine Q Music,26 predicted 
the end of concerts by foreign bands in China, and a “return to the dakou 
era,” during which foreign music was only available on the black market.
From the “hip-hop ban” to the disappearance of Li 
Zhi: Acceleration of censorship during the Xi era
The case of Chinese hip-hop is paradigmatic of the evolution of Chinese 
censorship, given that its status has evolved over time, moving from being 
blacklisted to being co-opted by the Party due to its popularity. Initially 
confined to the musical underground of the 1990s with the creation of the 
so-called “Iron Mic” (Gangtie maike 鋼鐵麥克) rap contests, Chinese hip-hop 
has gained wide popularity in recent years. In 2015, People’s Daily (Renmin 
ribao 人民日報) announced the blacklisting by the Ministry of Culture of 
120 songs promoting “obscenity, violence, crime, and immorality,”27 which 
were removed from online streaming platforms. On this list, the majority 
were hip-hop bands from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, such as MC HotDog, 
a popular Taiwanese rapper. The Ministry of Culture’s list backfired, making 
previously unknown hip-hop bands such as In3 (Yinsan’er 陰三兒) famous 
overnight,28 and had surprisingly little impact, since MC HotDog participated 
a few years later as a jury member for the popular talent show The Rap of 
China (Zhongguo you xiha 中國有嘻哈), broadcasted online by iQiyi from 
June 2017, alongside Taiwanese singers Will Pan 潘瑋柏 and Chang Chen-yue 
張震嶽 and Chinese-Canadian pop-star Kris Wu 吳亦凡.
Overwhelmed by the growing popularity of the reality TV show and of 
hip-hop in general – with more than 2.68 billion online views for the first 
season of The Rap of China29 – on 19 January 2018, the SAPPRFT is believed 
to have banned from television “representatives of the hip-hop culture and 
its sub-culture” as well as tattooed individuals.30 This decision followed a 
scandal provoked by the Communist Youth League (Gong qing tuan 共青
團), which on its Weibo 微博 account accused PG-One, one of the winners 
of The Rap of China, of promoting drug use and sexism in one of his older 
songs (Amar 2018). Straight after, all the national media outlets cancelled 
on-air appearances by Chinese rappers, while streaming websites removed 
rap songs from their platforms. This decision, however, sparked many debates 
in the Chinese press, especially since it was not officially announced – the 
SAPPRFT notice and a screenshot of it, published by the Sina portal, remain 
unconfirmed. Media outlets and online streaming platforms nevertheless 
took the precautionary measure of removing any rap-like songs, exceeding 
the expectations of censorship institutions to the point of banning hanmai 喊
麥, a popular music genre on video-sharing platforms and akin to hip-hop.31 
This so-called censorship of an entire music genre, which received a lot of 
media attention, did not last, however, as The Rap of China returned for a 
second season in 2018, then a third one in 2019. If PG-One has become more 
discreet, his co-winner GAI, also a victim of the “hip-hop ban,” has returned 
to centre stage with songs more directly in line with the slogans of the 
authorities, such as “Great Wall” (Wanli changcheng 萬里長城), produced 
by the clothing brand Lining 李寧.32 In the same manner, the Party tends to 
co-opt hip-hop artists in order to spread specific messages among the youth, 
using a cannier technique than censorship. For instance, videos by Chongqing 
nationalist rap band CD-Rev (Tianfu shibian 天賦事變), which mostly target 
the United States and Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文, are funded 
by the Communist Youth League. In March 2019, during the National People’s 
Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (Lianghui 
兩會), the official Xinhua News Agency 新華社 posted a song performed in 
English by Su Han 宿涵, a rapper and student of biomedical engineering at 
Tsinghua University, entitled “Two Sessions,” supposedly boasting about the 
merits of these plenary meetings, but it became the laughing stock of the 
international press and Chinese Internet users.33 
Although the January 2018 “hip-hop ban” showcased the contradictory 
mechanisms of state censorship, other recent practices, more discreet, reveal 
an attempt at heightened control of Chinese music production. In November 
2018, the online magazine Gang of Rock (Yaogun bang 搖滾幫) shared on 
Weibo a video of Cui Jian’s song “A Piece of Red Cloth” (Yi kuai hongbu 一
塊紅布, 1991), which can be interpreted, like many of his songs, as a thinly 
veiled critique of the communist regime and of the repression of the 1989 
movement. A few hours later, the Weibo message and Cui Jian’s song had 
disappeared. Moreover, since the end of 2018, almost all of Cui Jian’s songs 
have simply been removed from online streaming platforms (Xiami, QQ 
Music, Baidu Music amongst others), including “Yi wu suo you” (一無所有), 
certainly the most popular Chinese rock song. Cui Jian is not the only victim 
of this sudden and unexplained level of censorship: Zhou Yunpeng 周雲蓬, 
a visually-impaired folk singer from Shenyang, as well as Miserable Faith 
(Tongku de xinyang 痛苦的信仰), a nü-metal band reconverted into reggae, 
have seen some of their titles disappear from Chinese online streaming 
platforms.
25. Interview with Wu Yong (pseudonym), Wuhan, 1 September 2018.
26. The article was quickly removed from the website by the magazine, but can be found in the 
China Digital Times archives: https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/2019/01/qthemusic-%e6%8
8%91%e4%bb%ac%e6%98%af%e4%b8%8d%e6%98%af%e5%86%8d%e4%b9%9f%e7%9
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9a%84%e6%bc%94%e5%87%ba%e4%ba%86%ef%bc%9f/?%2F (accessed on 30 June 2019).
27. Huang Wei 黃維, “文化部首次公佈120首網絡音樂產品黑名單將依法查處” (Wenhuabu 
shouci gongbu 120 shou wangluo yinyue chanpin heimingdan jiang yifa chachu, The Ministry 
of Culture published an online blacklist of 120 songs ultimately to be examined according to 
the law), 人民日報 Renmin ribao, 10 August 2015, http://culture.people.com.cn/n/2015/0810/
c87423-27439050.html (accessed on 30 June 2019). 
28. Tiffany Ap, “China’s Online Ban Against ‘Fart’ and 119 other ‘Immoral’ Songs,” CNN, 12 August 
2015, https://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/12/asia/china-song-ban/index.html (accessed on 30 
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4 March 2019, https://radiichina.com/chinas-newest-propaganda-rap-video-is-goddamn-
ridiculous/ (accessed on 30 June 2019).
31N o .  2 0 2 0 / 2  •  china p e r s p e c t i v e s
Nathanel Amar – Navigating and Circumventing (Self)censorship in the Chinese Music Scene
This recent musical censorship has had very tangible consequences for 
some artists. In 2019, folk singer Li Zhi 李志, who had stood out the previous 
year for suing a reality TV show,34 was forced to cancel his Sichuan tour the 
day before his first concert. In a Weibo message posted in February 2019, Li 
Zhi professed health issues, with a photo attached, and announced that he 
would refund the 18,000 tickets already purchased. A few days later, Chinese 
and international media revealed without further details that the singer had 
to cancel his tour due to “inappropriate behaviour.”35 In April, all of Li Zhi’s 
social network accounts (Weibo, Douban…) disappeared, along with all of 
his songs. There has been no more news of Li Zhi, and no one knows of his 
whereabouts for the time being.36 The Chinese music community mobilised to 
pay homage to the folk singer, such as during the 2019 Midi festival, where he 
received the singer of the year award in absentia. The cautious announcement 
of the results on Weibo – the Midi festival having announced the awarding of 
the price to a “citizen of Nanjing, Mr. Li” (Nanjing shimin Li xiansheng 南京市
民李先生) – was censored a few hours after its publication (Figure 3).
In all likelihood, the disappearance of Li Zhi and the removal of Chinese rock 
songs of the 1980s from the Chinese internet are attributable to a tightened 
political atmosphere on the eve of the Tiananmen democratic movement’s 
thirtieth anniversary, Li Zhi and Cui Jian’s songs being directly or indirectly 
linked to the 1989 student movement. This censorship of musical work is not 
confined to titles produced by artists from China, or solely to online music 
streaming platforms owned by Chinese companies. Apple Music was forced to 
remove the songs of pro-democracy Hong Kong artists such as Tat Ming Pair 
達明一派 and Denise Ho Wen-see 何韻詩37 from its Chinese store, as well 
as a song by Cantopop singer Jacky Cheung 張學友, “The Way of Man” (Jan 
gaan dou 人間道, 1990), composed by James Wong for the movie A Chinese 
Ghost Story II , since it also refers to the Tiananmen massacre. Following the 
2014 Umbrella movement and the protests against the 2019 extradition bill 
in Hong Kong, a large number of songs related to the protests were censored 
or removed from the Chinese internet. As a result, the song “Do you hear 
the people sing,” from the musical Les Misérables and sung by Hong Kong 
protestors, and Cantopop song “Queen’s Road East” (Wong hau daai dou 
dung 皇后大道東, 1991) by singers Lo Ta-yu 羅大佑 and Ram Chiang 蔣志
光 from Taiwan and Hong Kong respectively, and referring to the reversion of 
sovereignty, both disappeared from Chinese platforms.38
Chinese censorship thus extends beyond the borders of the PRC, targeting 
Chinese-speaking artists from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Economic pressure also 
tends to export practices of self-censorship, with artists becoming “blacklisted” 
as soon as they display positions that are contrary to the injunctions of 
the Chinese regime. These practices are not new and fluctuate according 
to historical circumstances. Already after 1989, the Taiwanese singer Hou 
Dejian 侯德健 was banned from China for having supported the students, 
before being able to move back to Beijing in 2006 and composing a song in 
2018 that glorifies Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream” (Zhongguo meng 中國夢).39 
Similarly, Taiwanese Mandopop singer A Mei 張惠妹 could not perform in 
the PRC for several years after singing the Taiwanese national anthem during 
Chen Shui-bian’s 陳水扁 inauguration ceremony in 2000, forcing Coca-Cola 
to replace A Mei in its commercials in the PRC.40 Denise Ho, who sided with 
the Democratic camp in Hong Kong, can no longer perform in the PRC and 
estimates in an interview that she “lost several million Hong Kong dollars 
after her music was removed from sale in China and she was blacklisted.”41 
The pro-independence Taiwanese metal band Chthonic (Shanling 閃靈), led 
by singer and MP Freddy Lim 林昶佐, had to cancel its participation in a 
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the censored message posted by the Midi Weibo account, announcing the 
winners of the 2019 Midi awards (reference to Li Zhi highlighted by author). Screenshot provided by 
the author.
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concert in Hong Kong in December 2018, organised by Denise Ho. Hong 
Kong Immigration refused to grant working visas to the members of the 
band given that they “lack special skills, knowledge or experience.”42 Thus, 
mainly in Hong Kong, mechanisms of censorship and self-censorship are 
being implemented, gradually shifting from economic pressure to more 
direct forms of intervention in cultural affairs by the authorities.
Conclusion
Far from being monolithic, the mechanisms of musical censorship in China 
take different forms: institutional, practical, and discretionary. In fact, the NRTA, 
and previously the SAPPRFT, is supposed to monitor and enforce government 
cultural policies at each administrative level. In practice, there are different 
ways to contend with these guidelines, whether in the release of music albums, 
the uploading of online tracks, or the organisation of concerts. The example 
of the punk rock community reveals how certain groups play with censorship 
by changing certain lyrics. The publication of albums by private stakeholders is 
also permitted by the introduction of state-owned companies on the market, 
which are required to find ways to self-finance, even if this means selling the 
rights to release albums to independent labels, while checking the ideological 
content of these albums. In the same way, the organisation of concerts falls 
within a grey area, involving negotiations with local authorities and distribution 
of bribes. This does not stop the authorities from intervening directly at 
concerts and festivals by muting the sound or by carrying out drug tests. 
In recent years, and especially since Xi Jinping came into office, the cultural 
and musical field has been controlled more closely. On the institutional front, 
the SAPPRFT, formerly under government control, has been dissolved into 
the NRTA, directly supervised by the Communist Party. In practical terms, it 
has become more difficult to organise concerts because of new tax policies 
42. Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong says pro-independence Taiwan band member barred as he lacks 
‘special skills, knowledge or experience’,” Hong Kong Free Press, 24 December 2018, https://www.
hongkongfp.com/2018/12/24/hong-kong-says-pro-independence-taiwan-band-member-barred-
lacks-special-skills-knowledge-experience/ (accessed on 30 June 2019).
43. “人民不需要自由, 這是最好的年代” (Renmin bu xuyao ziyou, zhe shi zuihao de niandai). See 
Li Zhi performing the song during a concert: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKYfH3N9KzA 
(accessed on 30 June 2019).
and police raids, while relations between the audience and police officers 
are getting more violent. The famous 2018 so-called “hip-hop ban” and its 
subsequent back-pedalling show the delays and amateurism of censorship, 
at the risk, however, of forgetting more worrisome discretionary decisions. 
The removal of many songs from online streaming platforms, targeting songs 
dating back in some instances to the 1980s, as well as the disappearance of 
Li Zhi, point to the possibility of a gradual distancing between independent 
music and the public domain. This echoes the much more disturbing current 
state of Uyghur music, whose most popular artists are criminalised by the 
Party-state, such as the pop singer Ablajan Awut Ayup, as well as the musician 
and dutar player Sanubar Tursun (Anderson and Byler 2019). Understanding 
and analysing the mechanisms of Chinese censorship and its latest evolutions 
helps to better grasp the current state of music in the Sinophone world, 
as Hong Kong and Taiwanese artists have to comply with the ideological 
demands of the Communist Party in order to continue to perform in the PRC 
– a new era that calls to mind Li Zhi’s premonitory warning featured in one of 
his songs, “The people don’t need freedom, this is the best era.”43
I Translated by Romain Dittgen.
I Dr. Nathanel Amar is a Researcher and the Director of the CEFC Taipei 
office (namar@cefc.com.hk).
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SMZB 生命之餅. 2001. 50,000. Scream Records (PRC) [Compact Disc].
SMZB 生命之餅. 2014. 中國來信 (Zhongguo laixin, A Letter from 
China). Maybe Mars (PRC) [Compact Disc].
Sober 清醒. 1997. 好極了?! (Hao ji le?!, Is it alright?!). Modern Sky 
(PRC) [Compact Disc].
UnderBaby 地下嬰兒. 1998. 覺醒 (Juexing, Awakening). Rock Records 
(PRC/Taiwan) [Compact Disc].
Wuliao Jundui 無聊軍隊. 1999. 無聊軍隊 (Wuliao Jundui, The 
Boredom Contingent). Scream Records (PRC) [Compact Disc].
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